ECO 100 - F2026 - 14
Overview
Matthew Baker connects oligopoly to game theory: unlike firms in perfect competition or a monopoly, a small number of large firms must anticipate one another’s strategies. He introduces payoff matrices, best responses, Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, and the prisoner’s dilemma, then applies them to the lysine duopoly of ADM and Ajinomoto, collusion, environmental cooperation, coordination, and penalty kicks.
Key takeaways
- Oligopolists must anticipate rivals’ prices, output, and advertising because each large firm’s choices can affect the others’ payoffs.
- A Nash equilibrium occurs when every player is choosing a best response to the others, so no one can gain by changing strategy alone.
- The ADM and Ajinomoto lysine example shows that producing a large quantity is each firm’s dominant strategy, even though both firms would earn more if they restricted output together.
- The prisoner’s dilemma captures how individually rational decisions can produce worse outcomes for everyone, as with both criminals confessing or countries failing to coordinate emissions cuts.
- Coordination games can have multiple Nash equilibria, while a penalty-shot game can require mixed strategies because each player continually counters the other’s predictable choice.
Chapters
- Perfect competition maximizes total consumer and producer surplus, while monopoly restricts output and charges a higher price.
- Monopoly creates deadweight loss because some mutually beneficial exchanges do not occur.
- Policy options include regulating a monopolist’s price or encouraging competition, though licensing, patents, and copyright can also create market power.
- Oligopoly describes markets with a few large firms and barriers to entry, such as automobiles, soft drinks, phones, and big-box retail.
- Matthew Baker estimates that oligopolists produce about 90% of the products consumers buy.
- Monopolistic competition involves many firms selling differentiated products, as with nearby coffee shops, restaurants, and gas stations.
- A competitive firm takes the market price as given, and a monopolist faces no direct rival, but oligopolists must anticipate named competitors.
- McDonald’s considers Burger King’s choices, just as Ford considers Chevrolet and Tesla when setting prices, output, and advertising.
- Game theory models strategic interactions by specifying players, actions, rules, and payoffs, initially assuming rational players with complete information.
- A 2-by-2 normal-form game assigns two actions to each player, labeled row and column.
- Each cell records both players’ payoffs, with the row player’s payoff listed first and the column player’s second.
- Payoffs can represent profits, money earned in an experimental economics lab, or other outcomes players value.
- To find a best response, compare one player’s payoffs while holding the opponent’s action fixed.
- In the up/down and left/right example, if column chooses right, row prefers down; if row chooses down, column prefers right.
- Down and right form a Nash equilibrium because neither player can improve their payoff by changing actions alone.
- In a second 2-by-2 example, the best responses align at top and left, producing another Nash equilibrium.
- John Nash proved that every game has a Nash equilibrium, although games may have multiple equilibria.
- A dominant strategy is best regardless of the opponent’s action; a dominated strategy is always worse and can be eliminated.
- In the symmetric example, row’s dominant action is down and column’s dominant action is right, giving each player a payoff of 2.
- Both players would earn more at the up and left outcome, but neither can unilaterally switch there while improving their own payoff.
- The example shows how individually rational choices can make all players worse off than coordinated cooperation would.
- The lysine market example models ADM and Ajinomoto choosing between producing a small or large quantity.
- When both firms produce a small quantity, each earns $180 million; when both produce a large quantity, each earns $160 million.
- Producing a large quantity is each firm’s dominant strategy, since it yields a higher payoff whether the rival produces little or much.
- ADM and Ajinomoto would prefer limiting output together, earning $180 million each rather than $160 million each.
- Each firm has an incentive to break the agreement by producing more while its rival restricts output, making collusion unstable.
- Collusion is illegal in the United States, and the lysine firms were fined after attempting to coordinate production.
- In the Thelma and Louise example, each criminal chooses whether to confess, with confessing producing a better sentence for either possible choice by the other.
- Both confessing is the equilibrium, leaving each with a 15-year sentence instead of the five-year outcome they could achieve by both staying silent.
- The same incentive pattern can explain why members of a criminal enterprise may undermine cooperation once investigators separate them.
- Countries can each benefit when emissions fall, but each has an incentive to let another country bear the cost of reducing pollution.
- In the arms-race example, unilateral disarmament risks leaving one country vulnerable, so both the United States and the Soviet Union have reason to remain armed.
- These collective action problems show how self-interest can block outcomes that would benefit everyone, unlike the usual competitive-market result.
- Two friends choosing between Knicks and Nets games have two Nash equilibria: both attend the Knicks game or both attend the Nets game.
- Communication and commitment can help select an equilibrium when players prefer different coordinated outcomes.
- In the stag hunt, cooperating to hunt a stag gives both players a payoff of 3, while hunting rabbits guarantees a safer payoff of 1.
- In the penalty-shot game, a shooter and goalie can counter each other’s left or right choice, so no fixed pure strategy is stable.
- The equilibrium requires randomizing, such as mixing between left and right, a prediction economists have tested with penalty kicks and tennis serves.
- Baker previews sequential entry games and models such as Bertrand competition and Hotelling for the next lecture.
Transcript excerpt
0:00 Okay, exciting day today. Lecture 14, game theory, uh where we get to this is one of my favorite subjects. Uh so I'm kind of looking forward to uh talking about all of this. Um okay, so why are we talking about it? I'll get to that momentarily. So just as far as the readings go, there is another chapter up uh for you to uh look at. Uh homework coming uh maybe later today. Um, and this is our calendar. It looks like we are as of today 2 weeks out from our next exam, which is probably not such a big deal for you because we all know, you know, how the how the whole drill works there. Uh, so, right, we'll I guess we'll have another lecture. Um, I'll hand out lecture materials on the
0:49 4th and then uh yeah, so we have kind of two lectures left, which is good. This is working out quite nicely. We'll have a little review here as we did before and then we'll just do the exam and then we'll move on with our lives and do the last part of the class. One thing I will mention is that uh each uh little leadup to an exam period is self-contained. So put another way what I'm trying to say is that none of the exams are uh completely inclusive. So even our final exam will just be on uh whatever happens after the 11th uh going forward. Uh so anyways let's worry about this exam and uh just getting through that and let's uh get dive right in and start talking about our material for the day here. So
1:38 you want to think about it this way. If I were to kind of crush most of what we've said in the last uh couple of
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Summary, takeaways, and chapters were generated by AI from the video's transcript and may contain errors. The video belongs to its creator, Matthew Baker.